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Abstract
Contracts are mechanisms for carrying out transactions. Leasing land is a voluntary transaction in 
which property rights – such as user and income rights – are transferred from landowners to tenants. 
The bundle of property rights transferred within a lease transaction varies with the type of contractual 
arrangement. Analysis shows that for the landowner the value of the bundle of property rights to land 
is determined by the type of lease contract. Landowners prefer lease contracts with as little regulation as 
possible. Lease regulation can be characterized as a ‘handbook’ for concluding lease contracts. However, 
reducing regulation requires a shift in co-ordination mechanisms from that of the handbook to that of 
the ‘invisible hand’ (prices) and ‘handshake’ (e.g., mutual adjustment). Making use of the handshake and 
price as co-ordination mechanisms implies that the importance of trust and reputation will increase for 
both tenant and landowner. In 2007, the Dutch government introduced two new types of formal lease 
that rely less on handbook co-ordination. Whether a more liberalized lease system will lead to a change 
in the area leased not only depends on landowners but also on tenants, because contracts are two-sided 
mechanisms.  
Additional keywords: contractual relationships, co-ordination mechanisms, landowner, lease policy, lease 
regulation, liberalization, tenant 
Introduction
Today, land-leasing policy in the Netherlands is still under discussion. An important 
starting point for the beginning of this discussion was the 2000 report of the Lease 
Policy Commission (Commissie Pachtbeleid; Anon., 2000), entitled Ruimte voor Pacht
(Scope for Leasing). This report evaluated the current policy and suggested policy 
amendments. The Commission concluded that maintaining the current levels of 
protection of the tenant would lead to the marginalization of leasing. The Commission 
therefore proposed to drastically liberalize the lease policy. After a discussion lasting 
398 NJAS 55-4, 2008
some seven years, the Lease Regulation of September 2007 adopted a more liberalized 
lease, although the changes were not drastic.  
 During the lease policy debates, the legal aspects of changing the rules dominated the 
discussion. Little attention was given to institutional economic aspects, such as the type 
of contracts between landowner and tenant, and the economic impact of these contractual 
relationships. Leasing of land requires landowners to agree to a contract with tenants. 
Such contracts have a number of characteristics, such as a voluntary exchange, co-ordination
and motivation mechanisms, implicit or explicit agreements, and a degree of flexibility. 
Lease contracts transfer parts of the bundle of property rights – such as the user and 
income rights – from the landowner to the tenant in exchange for a benefit, primarily 
a lease rent. As well as being a transaction mechanism, a lease contract is a two-sided 
exchange between landowner and tenant, often for a specific period. 
 An important difference between land lease and land ownership is the incomplete 
power of control over the bundle of property rights. The lease contract defines the transfer 
of property rights: what is transferred to the tenant and what is left for the landowner. 
So an intriguing question is: what is the relationship between the properties of lease 
contracts and the values of the different contractual arrangements for the landowner? 
 The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to analyse the properties of lease contracts 
including the bundle of property rights; and (2) to determine – theoretically and 
empirically – the value of the bundle of property rights of different types of lease 
contracts from the viewpoint of the landowner.
 This paper proceeds as follows. The following chapter gives an overview of 
the area of leased land and briefly describes the types of lease contract used in the 
Netherlands. Next, the properties of the lease contracts are analysed, with emphasis 
on the co-ordination mechanisms used in lease contracts and property rights. In the 
chapter thereafter, the values of the bundle of property rights for different contractual 
arrangements are determined based on a survey among landowners and land agents. 
The final chapter concludes.  
Land lease contracts in the Netherlands
The total area of leased land in the Netherlands has sharply declined in the course 
of time. It reached its maximum in 1948 with 57% of the total area of agricultural 
land being leased. This peak was largely the result of the granting of land in the 
Wieringermeerpolder and the Noordoostpolder – two polders reclaimed from the 
former Zuider Zee – to tenant–farmers. Between 1950 and 2005, the area of rented 
land gradually decreased to about 27% of the total agricultural area. Tables 1 and 2 
provide an overview of the developments that took place during the period 1950–2005. 
In the period 1995–2005, the percentage of regularly leased land was still decreasing 
(Table 2). Even with two new types of lease – the one cultivation-cycle lease and the 
single-term lease – both introduced through the Lease Law of 1995, the total area of 
leasing decreased after 1999. The hereditary lease – which is not included in Table 
2 – decreased from about 4% in 1995 to 2% of the total agricultural area in 2005 
(Anon., 2007) and does not fall under the Lease Regulation. There are several types 
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of hereditary lease and the yearly rent is often higher than the rent of a regular lease 
contract. The duration of a hereditary lease is at least 26 years.
 Prior to the adaptation of the legal Lease Rules in 2007, the last important 
modification of the tenure system in the Netherlands was made in 1995. As shown in 
Table 2, since the modification of the Lease Law in 1995 there are three main formal 
types of leasing farmland in the Netherlands:
1. Regular lease contracts. These contracts have a term of 12 years for farmsteads and 6 
years for plots of land. Important characteristics of these contracts are: price control 
by lease rent-standards, continuation rights for the tenant, and priority rights for the 
tenants for the sale and purchase of land. In the period 1997–2005 the area of regular 
lease contracts declined from 23% to about 21% of the total agricultural area (Table 2). 
In 2005, the area under regular lease was about 394,000 ha.
2. One cultivation-cycle lease. These contracts for a plot of land have a term of one or 
two years, with no price control, no continuation rights, and no priority rights for the 
tenants. In the period 1997–2005 the area of one cultivation-cycle lease contracts was, 
on average, about 2% of the total agricultural area (Table 2). In 2005, the area under 
one cultivation-cycle lease was about 35,000 ha.
3. Single-term lease. These contracts for plots of land have a minimum duration of one 
and a maximum of 12 years, with no price control, no continuation rights, and no 
priority rights for the tenants. It is a once-only contract; parties are only allowed to 
conclude such a contract for a certain plot of land once. In the period 1997–2005, the 
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Table 1. Distribution (%) of land use (1950–2005).
 1950 1959 1970 1979 1983 1985 1990 1995 2005
Ownership 44.1 47.6 51.9 59.9 61.4 63.0 67.5 70.3 73.3
Lease 1 55.9 52.4 48.1 40.1 38.6 37.0 32.5 29.7 26.2
1  Excluding hereditary lease and grey lease.
Sources: Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) & Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Table 2. Distribution (%) of land leased under different types of contract.
Year Total area  Regular lease One cultivation- Singe-term
 leased 1    cycle lease  lease
1997 29.0  22.7  1.6   4.4
1998 29.3  21.7  1.8   5.4
1999 29.9  21.5  1.8   6.1
2003 26.7  21.0  1.6   3.9
2005 26.2  20.5  1.8   3.8
1  Excluding hereditary lease and grey lease.
Sources: Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) & Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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area under single-lease contracts was on average about 4.5% of the total agricultural 
area (Table 2). In 2005, the single-term lease was about 73,000 ha. 
 These three types of lease contract were regulated through the 1995 Lease Law, 
which implies that regular lease contracts and single-term lease contracts have to be 
approved by the Land Tenure Board (Grondkamer). The Land Tenure Board checks 
whether the contracts are in accordance with the Dutch lease regulation. For one 
cultivation-cycle leases, only registration by the Land Tenure Board is required. 
 The 2007 Lease Regulation introduced two new types of liberalized formal lease 
contracts that replaced the single-term lease: (1) a contract of 6 years or shorter, and (2) 
a contract longer than 6 years. Both types imply no continuation and priority right for 
the tenant, but compulsory approval by the Land Tenure Board. The lease for more than 
6 years also includes price control to lease rent-standards by the Land Tenure Board. 
Regular leases and one cultivation-cycle leases were hardly affected by the adaptation of 
legal Lease Rules in 2007.
 In addition to formal lease contracts, there are also grey-lease contracts, which 
are not registered or approved by the Land Tenure Board. They can be used as an 
alternative to formal lease contracts. The total area under grey-lease contract has 
increased from about 150,000 ha (= 8% of the total agricultural area in the Netherlands) 
in 1997/98 to about 190,000 ha, or almost 10% of the total agricultural area in 2005 
(Berkhout & Van Bruchem, 2007). Very few data are available on this type of contract. 
Grey-lease contracts are concluded with a specific objective (e.g., sale-contracts of 
manure, cultivation-cycle contracts, sub-leasing). The content and form of this type of 
lease contribute significantly to flexible land use. Research on grey-lease contracting 
also indicates a certain continuity in the relationship between tenant and landowner 
(Slangen et al., 2003), indicating that the identity of the parties is important.
Properties of lease contracts 
Lease contracts are governance structures for carrying out lease transactions.  Examples 
of such structures are markets, firms, contracts, and clubs (see also FitzRoy et al., 1998). 
Lease contracts can be described on the basis of the following properties: (1) voluntary 
exchange; (2) containing (a) co-ordination and (b) motivation mechanisms; (3) they can be 
explicit or implicit; (4) they are incomplete; and (5) property rights are transferred from 
landowners to tenants. These properties will be described in the following.
Voluntary exchange
Concluding a lease contract is a voluntary exchange, implying that it is only accepted if 
the expected result of the agreement is individually and mutually advantageous to both 
parties (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
Co-ordination mechanisms
Each lease contract contains co-ordination mechanisms. The relationship between 
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contracts and co-ordination mechanisms deserves further attention. First, there is 
no one-to-one relation between the two, because certain contracts – including lease 
contracts – can make use of a mix of different co-ordination mechanisms (cf. Hennart, 
1993). Secondly, co-ordination is a central issue in a governance structure. The contract 
has to specify what needs to be co-ordinated and how the co-ordination is achieved in 
governance structures such as spot markets, firms and contracts. 
 Figure 1 gives an overview of four groups of co-ordination mechanisms. Co-
ordination can take place by one of the four groups or by a combination of them. On 
the left side we have the ‘invisible hand’ group. The co-ordination mechanism here is 
the price. The price is the co-ordination mechanism for the governance structure ‘spot 
market’. In land lease contracts, purchase and delivery (or quid and quo) do not take 
place at the same moment. This means that the price, like in pure spot markets, cannot 
be the sole co-ordination mechanism for lease contracts. 
 At the bottom of Figure 1 we have the so-called ‘handbook’ group. The ‘handbook’ 
– as a co-ordination mechanism – is often used for the governance structure ‘contracts’. 
For detailed contracts the emphasis is on the handbook. Contracts often also contain 
a price as a co-ordination mechanism. In that case the co-ordination mechanism of 
contracts consists of a combination of ‘handbook’ and ‘invisible hand’. In general, the 
type of contract determines which co-ordination mechanism will prevail and what role 
the price will play in the relationship between the two parties.
 For regular land lease contracts, the co-ordination mechanism consists of rules, 
directives and safeguards based on the Lease Regulation. This means that the co-
ordination mechanism for regular lease contracts emphasizes the ‘handbook’, given by 
lease regulation. Important characteristics of these contracts include: a fixed duration 
(12 years for farmstead and 6 years for plots of land), price control by lease-price 
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Handshake
Mutual adjustment  
Common values and 
norms  
Identity matters 
Invisible hand
Price
Visible hand
Authority
Direct supervision 
Handbook
      Rules 
      Directives 
      Safeguards 
Co-ordination 
Figure 1. Co-ordination mechanisms (adapted after Borgen & Hegrenes, 2005)
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standards, continuation and priority right for the tenants. Because of price control 
by regional lease-price standards – tested by the Land Tenure Board – the price plays 
a minor role as a co-ordination mechanism. The modest role of the price as a co-
ordination mechanism also holds for the liberalized lease contracts lasting more than 
six years, because of the price control to lease-rent standards by the Land Tenure Board. 
However, as continuation and priority rights for the tenants are lacking, there is less 
emphasis on the handbook compared with regular leases.   
 The single-term lease and the one cultivation-cycle lease have no price control 
and no continuation or priority rights for the tenant. Both make use of a mix of the 
handbook (but less intensively than the regular lease contracts) and the price as a 
co-ordination mechanism, because there is no price control. Based on an analysis of 
contracts registered by the Land Tenure Board it was concluded that the lease price is 
higher for single-term lease contracts than for regular lease contracts (Slangen et al., 
2003). No data were available for one cultivation-cycle lease. For the liberalized lease of 
six years or shorter, we may expect the same mix of co-ordination mechanisms as for 
the single-term lease. 
 At the right side of Figure 1, we have the ‘visible hand’ group based on hierarchy, 
which means that the positions in a firm are ranked: higher order levels command 
lower levels. In this case the co-ordination will be carried out by authority or direct 
supervision. The ‘visible hand’ group of co-ordination mechanisms is not relevant for 
contracts in general, and lease contracts in particular. After all, landowners have their 
own business and are not vertically integrated with the tenant–farmer. Both parties 
– the landowner and tenant–farmer – retain their separate external identity.
 An exception to this could be sharecropping. Sharecropping is prevalent in low-
income countries such as developing countries. However, sharecropping is also a 
common lease form in some developed countries such as the USA and New Zealand. In 
the USA about 25% of all agricultural enterprises use some form of sharecropping (see 
also Allen & Lueck, 2002). This form of land tenancy is known for its many versions: 
from sharing the yields to sharing costs of inputs and combinations of it. In Western 
Europe, the fixed monetary leases are dominant and sharecropping is almost unknown. 
In fact, in the Netherlands, sharecropping is legally prohibited and practically 
eliminated. The Lease Regulation prescribes a fixed monetary lease price. So for formal 
lease contracts in the Netherlands, a lease price that depends on sharecropping results 
is not possible (see also Slangen et al., 2003). An extensive analysis of sharecropping in 
the USA is given in this volume in the paper of Huffman & Fukunaga (2008).
 At the top of Figure 1 we have the ‘handshake’ as a co-ordination mechanism. 
Important elements of the ‘handshake’ are common values and norms, mutual 
adjustment, and the identity of the persons involved. Common values and norms 
(based on repeated interaction promoting solidarity, consensus and trust) and codes of 
conduct can serve as a co-ordination mechanism concerning groups of people. Mutual 
adjustment refers to the co-ordination achieved by informal horizontal communication. 
 In practice, as explained before, grey-lease contracts also involve continuity in the 
relationship between tenant and landowner. It means that the identity of contracting 
parties matters. The ‘handshake’, supplemented with the price, is often used as a 
co-ordination mechanism for such types of lease contracts. So the co-ordination 
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mechanism for grey lease is a mix of the ‘handshake’ and the ‘invisible hand’. Grey-
lease contracts can be verbal or written, the content is free and officially unknown, 
which is an important difference with the regular, the single-term and the one 
cultivation-cycle lease. The fewer prerequisites by regulation for liberalized lease with 
a duration of 6 years or shorter (see previous chapter) and no price control implies 
a mix of ‘handshake’, price and – to a lesser extent – ‘handbook’ as co-ordination 
mechanisms. For the liberalized lease longer than 6 years, the price control by the Land 
Tenure Board is still compulsory. This means more emphasis on the ‘handbook’ for 
this type of contract than for a liberalized lease with a duration of 6 years or less. 
Motivation mechanisms
Another property of contracts is that they contain motivation mechanisms (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992). The motivation mechanisms for regular, single-term, one cultivation-
cycle and grey lease are not the same. Motivation can be driven by external factors, such 
as lease regulation and financial incentives, and by internal ones, like the pressure 
or feelings to do one’s work well, trustworthiness and having or building-up a good 
reputation. However, there can be a trade-off between internal and external motivation, 
such that too much emphasis on external motivation can drive out internal motivation 
(Le Grand, 2003). 
Explicit and implicit contracts
An important property of lease contracts is that the set of agreements in a contract can 
be explicit or implicit. An explicit contract is a written document about the agreement. 
This especially applies to the regular lease. The lease contracts for the single-term lease, 
the liberalized lease with a duration of 6 years or less, and the one cultivation-cycle 
lease are less explicit. They have no price control, no continuation and no priority rights 
for the tenants, but the contracts for the single-term lease and the liberalized lease 
with a duration of 6 years or less have to be approved by the Land Tenure Board. One 
cultivation-cycle lease contracts have only to be registered. The liberalized lease of more 
than 6 years holds a position between regular lease contracts and other formal ones.
 Grey-lease contracts often have the character of an implicit contract: no formal 
record of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. Such contracts are 
enforceable by the reputation mechanism (see also Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). For this 
type of contract it is important that parties are able to develop and maintain a desired 
reputation. A party with a short-term horizon is less willing to invest in a reputation 
than a party with a longer-term horizon. Similarly, investing in a reputation is more 
attractive at the beginning of an activity (such as leasing) than at the end. As indicated 
before, the identity of contracting partners matters and therefore contract parties have 
to build up reputation.  
Incompleteness 
Lease contracts are incomplete. In brief, this means that events could take place that 
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were not foreseen in the contract. For example, the introduction of production rights 
for milk, sugar, manure or ammonia, and the introduction of income rights (single 
farm payment) were not taken into account by lease contracts that date from long 
before these rights were introduced. In the current lease system, the Agricultural 
Land Tribunal safeguards formal lease contracts. Legal principles also limit potential 
consequences of incomplete contracts such as opportunistic behaviour of tenant and 
landowner, and hold-up problems (Slangen & Oskam, 2003). Such problems arise from 
investments in buildings (barns and sheds), drainage and soil improvement that were 
not taken into account in the lease contract (Slangen et al., 2003). Hold-up implies that 
important specific investments in land and buildings are not carried out. If a tenant 
has a contract without the possibility for renewal or continuation of the contract, or 
without compensation for the investments, he will not invest. The lease regulation for 
regular lease contracts contains safeguards for such investments. However, single-term 
lease contracts and one cultivation-cycle lease contracts offer less protection for specific 
investments. 
Transfer of property rights
The last property is that lease contracts can be characterized as a bundle of property 
rights that is partly transferred from landowner to tenant. The bundle of property rights 
consists of: the rights (1) to use the land, (2) to acquire income from the land, (3) to 
change the form and substance of the land, (4) to exclude others, and (5) to transfer 
the land to others through markets or to their heirs (see also Furuboth & Richter, 
2005). Especially the income and transfer rights are often emphasized as marking the 
economic meaning of ownership. As explained earlier, in the Netherlands we have 
different types of land tenure contracts, comprising different bundles of property 
rights. The bundle of rights that is transferred within a lease transaction varies with 
the contractual arrangement. The contract specifies the allocation of the property 
rights to land between the landowner and the tenant. The bundle of property rights 
can be described in terms of (1) control, (2) division, (3) protection, (4) duration, (5) 
enforceability, (6) flexibility, and (7) transferability. 
Control rights over property rights 
In general, control rights are rights to make decisions concerning use, returns or 
transfer of an asset. In terms of property rights to land, control rights indicate up to 
what level a person has the right to make decisions about the bundle of property rights 
to land and about land-related property rights. Control rights consist of (1) specific 
control rights and (2) residual control rights. The specific control rights are the rights 
specified by the lease contract or lease regulation. Residual control rights are the 
rights to make decisions on the assets' use, returns, and transfer that are not explicitly 
controlled by law or assigned by a contract (see also Hendrikse, 2003). 
 The residual income from land that remains after all obligations are met (residual 
income) is often captured by those who have the residual control rights. There are 
different types of residual incomes from land and land-related production or income 
rights:
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• the residual income in the short term arising from current land use; 
• the long-term residual income which arises through the increase in the value of the land; 
• the value (plus increase) of the production rights and the income rights (such as the 
 single farm payment (SFP). 
 The introduction of production rights for milk, sugar, manure and ammonia has 
led to new property rights. The production quotas connected with these rights are 
transferable and represent a value. Concerning the milk quota, the tenant is obliged 
to return the milk quota in full to the landowner at the end of the lease contract. In 
this case the tenant has a right to a fifty–fifty compensation. For sugar, manure and 
ammonia, the rules are similar. In the Netherlands, the discussion about the ownership 
of the SFP lasted more than a year and a half. On 25 September 2007, the Agricultural 
Land Tribunal decided that the rights on these SFPs – after terminating the lease 
agreement – belong to the landowner. The latter has to compensate the tenant on a 
fifty–fifty basis. This rule is in compliance with the milk regulation in the Netherlands. 
 The person entitled to residual income varies. The short-term residual income goes 
to the tenant-farmer who generates marketable products, the long-term residual income 
arising from the increased value of the land goes to the landowner, and at least 50% of 
the long-term residual income of production rights for milk and income rights of SFP 
also goes to the landowner. These three types of residual income are strong incentives 
for tenants to become the landowner, certainly if they can buy the land at the leased 
value (Slangen et al., 2003). As to formal contracts, the Agricultural Land Tribunal is 
used for solving disputes concerning capturing residual incomes. 
Division of property rights
Within the bundle of property rights associated with land, certain property rights can 
be distinguished, e.g., user rights. The property rights that a tenant–farmer obtains 
consist mainly of the short-term income right and the user rights. However, his right 
to transfer (e.g., sub-leasing) and the right to exclude others, are much more restricted 
than those of an owner. 
 Certain rights can also be distinguished based on the degree of excludability, i.e. 
the extent to which others can be excluded from use. Lack of excludability leads to 
incompleteness of property rights. Two or more individuals together could own the 
property rights to an asset. The incomplete divisibility of the property rights means 
that some attributes cannot be specified in excludable rights for individual property-
right holders. This means that farmers have to share, for example, the property rights 
to nature and landscape with citizens. They can hardly exclude people from enjoying 
nature and landscape even on their own land.
Protection of the rights 
Property rights created by the government can function as a policy instrument for 
achieving certain goals, such as lease contracts (based on the Lease Regulation), 
production rights for milk, sugar and manure, and income rights (e.g., SFP). Important 
questions are: who gets these rights and who will get effective protection from the 
government? The allocation of the property rights also indicates who must pay whom 
in order to have access to the interests that are derived from these rights. Important 
Land lease contracts: properties and the value of bundles of property rights 
406 NJAS 55-4, 2008
aspects are: to what extent are the rights respected, can they be enforced, and are 
individuals compensated for a loss of a right? All these questions determine the content 
of the bundle of property rights.
 The institutional environment, consisting of the informal and formal rules in a 
society, is important for the protection of the property rights. This environment in 
which the property rights are embedded is not constant, and neither is the status or 
the allocation of property rights among people. Property rights may change from one 
generation to the other. This is shown by the way in which the government recognizes 
and protects property rights. Weak or insecure property rights, such as a lack of 
continuation right or no compensation for installed improvements, bring tenant–
farmers in a hold-up situation.
Duration 
Is the disposal of a bundle of property rights (or part of it) to land restricted to a 
specific period, and if so what is its duration? The periods for which property rights to 
farmsteads and plots of land are leased vary greatly. In the Netherlands, the following 
terms apply to land-use contracts: for hereditary lease the term is 26 years or longer, for 
a lease of a farmstead the term is 12 years, for a plot of land the term can be longer than 
6 years, 6 years or less, for cultivation-lease 1 or 2 years. In general, duration has an 
inverse effect on the value of the bundle of property rights to the land.
Enforceability of property rights
The value of the bundle of property rights of lease agreements also depends on 
the compliance with the contractual arrangements and enforcement of the rights. 
Monitoring, sanctions and conflict-solving are the responsibility of governmental 
services. The control on compliance with the current lease system (Lease Regulation and
lease rent-standards) is carried out by the Land Tenure Board. The Agricultural Land 
Tribunal functions as a conflict-solving and enforcement mechanism. Enforcement by 
governmental services also protects the property rights of the landowner and tenant.
 Some people consider the legally enforceable principles currently in use too rigid 
(Anon., 2007), referring to the priority and continuity rights for the tenant and the lease-
price testing of certain lease contracts by the Land Tenure Board. However, these legal 
principles also limit the opportunistic behaviour of tenant and landowner. A weak point of 
the legal principles as enforcement mechanisms is that they are not suitable for unverifiable 
information (Bovenberg & Teulings, 1999) since they contain no information-revealing 
mechanism such as the market mechanism and the reputation mechanism.  
Flexibility 
Regulation principles reduce the flexibility of lease contract design by landowner and 
tenant. Flexibility refers to the questions: (1) are there changes in the rules of the game 
of the lease contract design (regulation); and if so (2) what are the consequences? 
The single-term and one cultivation-cycle lease increased the flexibility of land-use 
contracting, e.g., more types of lease contracts are now possible. The introduction 
of two types of liberalized leases (in September 2007) meant more flexibility. As 
explained, grey-lease contracts are often concluded with a specific objective, mostly 
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involving flexibility in land use. Although this type of lease contributes significantly to 
flexible land use, it does not belong to lease regulation.
Degree of transferability
The bundle of property rights of land is transferable – partly or fully – from one party 
to another party, e.g., by lease, sale and purchase, inheritance. However, the lease 
regulation limits transferability of property rights. Examples in the case of regular lease 
contracts are priority rights and continuation rights for tenants. Priority rights mean 
that if a landowner wants to sell his land he is obliged to offer it to the tenant first. 
Continuation rights imply that the tenant has the right to renew his contract. This has 
consequences for the value of the bundle of property rights to land.  
Based on the foregoing we can conclude that one of the most important characteristics 
of regular lease contracts is the ‘handbook’ as the main co-ordination mechanism and 
that the price plays a limited role. The ‘handbook’ is mainly determined by the Dutch 
lease regulation. For regular contracts, lease regulation implies an explicit written 
contract, a less flexible contract, and the transfer to the tenant of a relatively large 
part of the property rights for a relatively long period. For single-term contracts, the 
contract is more flexible (e.g., duration can be chosen from between 1 and 12 years) and 
land rents are free. Given the area and the growth of grey lease, it can be concluded 
that lease contracts that are based on the ‘handshake’ as a co-ordination mechanism 
and supported by the reputation mechanism are better able to fulfil the demands of 
landowners and tenants. Single-term leases can be positioned between the regular 
lease and the grey lease, and could be expected to be an alternative for the regular lease. 
However, the area with formal single-term lease contracts (introduced in 1995) did 
not grow since 1999. Apparently, single-term lease contracts hardly meet the needs of 
landowners and tenants. 
The valuation of the different contractual arrangements: 
empirical results
In the previous chapter we concluded that regular and single-term contracts do 
not meet the needs of landowners and tenants. The preferences of landowners for 
different contract types can be assessed by valuing their actual contracts. We expect 
that landowners attach a lower value to land under regular lease contracts than to land 
under other types of lease contract. To assess the differences in landowners’ valuation 
between different lease contracts, we carried out a large mail survey among landowners 
and land agents in autumn 2002 (see also Slangen et al., 2003). This survey was one 
of the first surveys among landowners and land agents that focused on property rights 
to land in the Netherlands. The targeted landowners belonged to the Dutch Society 
of Landowners (Federatie Particulier Grondbezit) of whom 250 randomly selected 
members received a questionnaire. One hundred and five completed questionnaires 
were returned – a response of nearly 42%. 
 Land agents fulfil a different role compared with landowners. They are experts 
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who often work for the landowners, but also as intermediaries between tenants and 
landowners. One hundred and forty five questionnaires were sent to a randomly 
selected sample of land agents. Sixty completed questionnaires were returned – a 
response of nearly 41% (see also Slangen et al., 2003). The structure and content of 
both questionnaires were similar, the differences were related to the different roles of 
both groups. The land agents were used as reference group. 
Results and discussion of the survey
When considering the behaviour of landowners, it is important to look at the question 
of why they have land. From their answers (Table 3) it appears – in terms of percentage 
of respondents – that maintaining family property was the most important reason, 
followed, in terms of percentage of hectares, by land ownership as an investment. The 
category other reasons was largest. This is caused by the area of the State Forestry Service 
and nature conservation organizations, which keep land for wildlife and landscape 
management, and often are large landowners. 
 Leasing land is one of the other objectives of land ownership. Within these 
objectives there is a certain hierarchy. When the objective with the highest hierarchy 
is achieved, it will be possible to realize the other objectives. The objective with the 
highest hierarchy is the return on capital/investment or profitability target. If this is 
Table 3. Reasons of landowners for owning  land (n = 105).
Reason  Respondents   Area
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  (%)  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Maintaining family property  69  10
Investment  36  16
Managing and conserving real estate 7  35
Other   9  43
Note: as it was possible for interviewees to indicate more than one reason, the percentages do not add up to 100.
Table 4. The value of untenanted and tenanted land in the opinion of land agents and landowners.
 Value of tenanted land  Value of tenanted land 
 relative to untenanted  depends on type of 
 land   lease contract
 n Value (%) n  Value (%)
Land agents 48 52 51 92
Landowners 67 46 90 73
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sufficient it is possible to realize the other objectives.  A good return makes it possible 
to realize the other targets of the landowners as well. More than one third of the 
respondents gave investment as reason for land ownership (Table 3).  
 Landowners and land agents were asked to value the land under the different land 
lease contracts. Both groups stated that the value of tenanted land is about 50% of the 
value of untenanted land (Table 4). The small difference in response between land agents 
and landowners was not statistically significant. A significant majority of both groups 
furthermore stated that the value of tenanted land depends on the type of lease contract. 
 Given the fact that different land-leased contracts have a different bundle of 
property rights, we may expect – based on the previous chapter – that land with lease 
contracts without any restrictions concerning lease price, continuation rights or priority 
rights will have a higher value from the viewpoint of the landowner. Duration can also 
play a role. A one cultivation-cycle lease has a duration of 1 or 2 years, and the single-
term lease a duration ranging from 1 to 12 years. Because of this, we may expect that 
the one cultivation-cycle lease has a higher value for the landowner than the single-term 
lease. Given the rules for regular lease, we may expect the landowners to assign the 
lowest value to regular lease contracts.
 Individual landowners and land agents were asked to rank land with different lease 
contracts from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates the highest and 5 the lowest value. This resulted 
in five sets of rankings for five different lease contracts. The objective was to determine 
associations among the rankings by using Kendall’s coefficient of concordance W
(Siegel, 1956; Churchill, 1999). Kendall’s coefficient of concordance expresses the 
degree of association among variables. For instance, in this case if landowners would 
have agreed unanimously to the value of the bundle of property rights of a particular 
lease contract, that contract would always have received the ranking 1 for the highest value 
and thus the sum of ranks would have been 34 (the number of landowners – Table 5) and 
Table 5. Ranking of types of land lease contract according to their value in the opinion of landowners and 
land agents.
Lease type Mean rank by:
 Landowners Land agents
Regular lease 4.2 4.5
Single-term lease 2.7 2.6
One cultivation-cycle lease 2.3 2.1
Grey lease 2.4 2.0
Hereditary lease 3.5 3.8
-----------------------
Statistics
Number of observations 34 30
Kendall’s W 0.26 0.48
χ2  34.7 58.1
d.f. 4 4
P-value 0.00 0.00
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the mean rank would have been 1. The second-ranked contract would then have a sum 
of ranks of 68 (mean rank 2), and the bundle with the lowest value would have received 
a rank of 170 (mean rank 5). If there is little agreement among the rankings of the five 
contracts, the sum of ranks would have been more or less equal per contract type.
 A statistically significant value of W indicates that landowners or land agents are 
applying essentially the same standard in ranking the five types of contract (Siegel, 1956). 
The coefficient of concordance is more or less χ2-distributed where χ2 = k(n–1)W (k is the 
number of landowners; n –1 is the number of degrees of freedom). The null hypothesis 
is that the rankings are not related, and the alternate hypothesis is that there is some 
agreement. From the P-value it follows that the null hypothesis can be rejected (P < 0.01).   
 Table 5 gives the mean rankings of leased land according to their value assigned by 
landowners and land agents. The one cultivation-cycle lease has the highest value for 
the landowners, followed by grey lease. For the landowners, single-term lease is the 
third highest, followed by hereditary lease. The differences between landowners and 
land agents are small; land agents value grey lease higher than one cultivation-cycle 
lease. As Table 5 shows, regular lease has the lowest ranking. It is even lower than 
hereditary lease. However, as has been mentioned before, hereditary lease does not fall 
under land lease regulation. The value of Kendall’s W is lower for the landowners than 
for the land agents. However as Table 3 shows, the motivation for land ownership is 
rather diverse, which has consequences for the valuation of contracts. For example, if 
we only look at landowners who own their land for ‘investment’, Kendall’s W will be 
substantially higher (about 0.6).
Conclusions
Measured in hectares, the three most important types of land lease contract are regular 
lease, grey lease and single-term lease. In September 2007, the single-term lease was 
replaced by two types of liberalized lease: contracts for more than 6 years and contracts 
for 6 years or less. When land is leased to a tenant–farmer, the landowner transfers 
part of the bundle of property rights of his land, mostly on a contractual basis. This 
means that he will lose part of the bundle of property rights for a certain period. The 
lease contract is the transaction mechanism and the content of the contract defines the 
transfer of property rights. In other words, the bundle of rights transferred within a 
lease transaction varies with the type of contract. The type of lease contract determines 
the value of the bundle of property rights for the land that remains for the landowner.
 One of the most important characteristics of regular lease contracts is the ‘handbook’ 
as the main co-ordination mechanism (based on the Lease Regulation) and the limited 
role of prices as a factor of adjustment. The single-term leases also make use of the 
handbook approach, but less intensively than regular lease contracts, because they have 
no price control and no continuation or priority rights for the tenants. The absence of 
price control for single-term lease contracts and its successor – single-term lease contracts 
shorter than 6 years – increases the role of price as a co-ordination mechanism. For the 
liberalized lease longer than 6 years, price control still applies. 
 Grey-lease contracts do not follow the formal lease regulation. The co-ordination 
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mechanism for grey lease is a mix of the ‘handshake’ and the price. The motivation 
to comply with the agreements comes from elements such as financial incentives and 
trustworthiness. For enforcement and renewing of grey-lease contracts, reputation is 
very important. Given the current lease regulation, building a good reputation is less 
important for regular lease transactions.
 Lease regulation reduces the flexibility of lease contracts. Especially in regular lease 
contracts, flexibility is almost non-existent. Single-term lease contracts offer more 
flexibility. However, this type of lease is less important than grey lease. Apparently, 
parties prefer grey lease to single-term lease. It is expected that the two versions of 
liberalized lease will contribute to more flexibility. The lease contracts differ in the 
content of the bundle of property rights transferred. For the landowner, the value of the 
contract will be higher if: 
• the level of control rights determined by lease regulation and contract is lower; 
• the degree of transferability of the bundle of property rights is higher; 
• the division of the rights is more to the benefit of the landowner; 
• the protection of the rights for the tenants is lower; 
• the duration of the contract is shorter; 
• the flexibility of contract design is higher; 
• more use is made of the price as co-ordination mechanism. 
 The empirical results confirm that the value of leased land for landowners depends 
on the type of contract. From the viewpoint of the landowner, the value of the bundle 
of property rights of single-lease, one cultivation-cycle lease and grey-lease contracts is 
significantly higher than for regular lease. Grey-lease contracts are valued highest. An 
intriguing question is why in spite of the high ranking of one cultivation-cycle lease, 
the area of this type of lease remains so small. One of the reasons could be that one 
cultivation-cycle lease is used for special crops, such as bulbs, carrot, and seed potato.
 These results will have important policy consequences. First, if landowners 
have more opportunities to lease plots of land with long-term formal lease contracts 
(liberalized lease), without price control, and no continuation or priority rights 
for tenants, this is expected to lead to a further decline of the area of regular lease 
(including farmsteads) in the future. Secondly, it is questionable whether the liberalized 
lease will be able to stop the decline in the formal leasing area. During the past 10 
years, grey-lease contracts were concluded more often than single-term lease and one 
cultivation-cycle lease. 
 Apparently, landowners prefer grey-lease contracts to single-term lease contracts. 
Less regulation requires a shift in co-ordination and motivation mechanisms. 
Making use of handshake and price as co-ordination mechanisms, but also of trust 
and reputation building, will become more important for tenants and landowners. 
Given that the liberalized lease was only introduced in September 2007, we have to 
be reserved in our conclusions about future developments. However, our findings 
with respect to the single-term lease and one cultivation-cycle lease, together with the 
increase in the grey-lease area, indicate that liberalized lease is not expected to maintain 
or increase the total area of formal leased land.
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